User:RogerDodger/sandbox

Payoffs

	d	b	SWR	4
FLY.1	29	-31	-68	34
FLY.2	-75	-31	75	79
FLY.4,2	-80	36	36	39
FLY.1+2	24	2	-68	-68
FLY.3+4	64	-68	13	65

Nash equilibrium with average payoff -4.79

FLY.1	FLY.2	FLY.4,2	FLY.1+2	FLY.3+4
0	0	0.39	0.33	0.28

d	b	SWR	4
0.35	0.44	0.21	0

Kazumi FLY mixup after 1+2, ws3, and u/f+2 transitions on infinite stage.

Mixup:Heihachi-sweep-f4.gbt (download) ^{What is this?}

Heihachi's strongest standing mixup, simplified. Assumes the opponent is not moving or challenging but merely guessing between mid and low. Ignoring d/b+2 under assumption that it's reactable in this situation.

	d	b	df
CD.df+4	-80	21	-50
f+4	57	2	57

Nash equilibrium with payoff 8.7

CD.df+4

0.35

f+4

0.65

d

0.12

b

0.88

Payoff for dominated options

df

-19.28

Mixup:Kazumi-db3-oh.gbt (download) ^{What is this?}

	FC.1	FC.2	FC.d+3	FC.df+4	ws1	ws1,2	ws2	ws3	ws4	ws4,4	u+2	f,F+2	uf+3,4	uf+4	cc 4	cc df+2	cc b+1+2	b,b	db	df	SSR,b	SSR,1,1	SSR,df+1	SSR,uf+4	SWR
1	-7	-10	-12	-8	12	12	12	12	12	12	-32	9	12	12	12	-71	-5	1	-1	-1	-1	-31	-33	33	-1
1,1	-8	-11	-14	-10	32	32	32	32	32	32	-34	29	32	32	32	-75	17	-1	-38	-38	-1	-32	7	40	-52
2,1	-8	-11	-14	-10	25	25	-79	25	25	25	-34	-17	51	25	25	-75	-26	-2	13	13	-3	-32	-35	-70	13
4	-7	-10	-12	-8	68	68	-75	68	68	68	-32	-10	49	68	68	-71	-20	-20	-38	-38	-30	-31	-33	-68	-38
f+2	-80	-82	-12	-10	13	-10	30	10	12	17	13	0	24	6	10	-71	-10	-4	-50	-50	-68	-31	-33	-68	-50
df+1	-8	3	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	-27	45	15	15	15	-25	0	13	13	-4	-31	-33	-68	-10
df+2	-8	-11	65	-10	-17	-41	75	-38	-18	-33	-34	20	54	70	-10	75	-4	-71	71	71	-71	-10	0	-15	-60
df+4	-8	-11	21	-10	-17	-41	21	21	-18	-33	21	-19	50	50	-50	21	-19	-1	18	18	-2	18	18	18	18
d+2	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	-69	11	11	11	-15	-4	-2	-56	-4	38	-33	-68	-4
d+3	-8	-11	14	-10	-17	-41	14	-4	-18	-33	14	14	-69	-68	12	14	12	12	-35	-56	12	14	14	14	12
d+4	-8	-11	11	-10	-17	-41	11	-6	-18	-33	11	11	65	-68	9	11	9	10	-38	-56	9	11	11	11	9
d+3+4	2	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	-69	7	7	7	6	6	-38	-56	6	6	6	6	6
db+1	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	-18	-4	-2	-56	-4	38	-33	-68	-4
db+3	-8	-11	15	-10	-17	-40	15	-38	-18	-33	-34	15	-69	-70	-64	15	13	13	-38	-56	13	-31	-33	-68	13
db+4	-8	-11	-14	-10	-17	-40	-59	-38	-18	-33	-34	-40	-69	-70	-64	22	19	19	-38	-56	19	22	22	22	-60
b+2	-8	-11	16	-10	-17	-40	16	16	-18	-33	16	-25	51	51	-57	16	-23	-4	14	14	-4	14	14	14	14
f,F+4	-8	-11	-14	-10	-17	-40	-79	-38	-18	-33	-34	-40	23	-70	-64	60	-14	-3	76	76	-71	-31	-33	-68	-71
uf+3,4	69	69	69	69	-50	-15	-22	-28	-51	-51	-25	-16	55	-51	-53	0	-8	0	0	0	-50	-10	0	-15	-50
uf+4	-8	68	68	68	-50	-15	70	70	-51	-51	70	-24	51	51	-53	0	-8	-50	68	68	-68	-10	-48	-15	-50
b,b	4	4	-12	-10	4	33	31	31	4	50	50	33	0	33	50	71	71	0	0	0	0	10	10	71	0
db	2	2	35	68	-15	-38	-75	-35	-16	-31	38	-37	0	-68	38	-71	71	0	0	0	0	1	0	33	0
df	56	56	56	56	-15	-38	-75	-35	-16	-31	38	-37	0	-68	38	-71	71	0	0	0	0	1	0	33	0
SSR,b	4	4	-12	-10	1	33	31	31	4	50	33	33	50	68	4	71	71	0	0	0	0	1	0	71	0
SSR,1,1	-38	-38	-12	-10	-17	-40	-75	-38	31	32	-34	-40	10	-70	-64	32	-29	-1	-1	-1	-1	32	32	32	31
SSR,df+1	33	33	-14	-10	-17	-40	-75	-38	33	35	-34	-40	49	-70	-64	15	-25	0	12	12	0	14	14	14	14
SSR,uf+4	68	68	-14	-10	-17	-40	-75	-38	68	70	-34	-40	16	-70	-64	0	-11	-71	-33	-33	-71	-44	70	70	-50
SWR	4	4	-12	-10	4	40	50	-35	4	50	-32	50	50	50	50	50	71	0	0	0	0	-31	-12	50	0
SSL,b	4	4	-12	-10	1	15	31	31	1	50	33	33	50	50	4	60	60	0	0	0	0	1	0	50	0
SSL,1,1	-38	-38	-12	-10	-17	-40	-75	-38	-18	-33	-34	-40	44	-70	-64	-50	-29	-1	-1	-1	-1	32	32	32	31
SSL,df+1	33	33	-14	-10	-17	-40	-75	-38	-18	-33	-34	-40	11	11	-64	-30	76	0	12	12	0	14	14	14	14
SSL,uf+4	68	68	-14	-10	-17	-40	-75	-38	-18	-33	-34	-40	51	51	-64	-22	-8	-71	-33	-33	-71	-44	70	70	68
SWL	4	4	-12	-10	4	40	50	-35	-16	-31	50	-30	50	50	50	-26	60	0	0	0	0	-31	-12	-40	0
1+2	-1	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	-27	16	30	30	30	-25	-33	30	30	-33	28	28	28	-50

Nash equilibrium with payoff 0.42

2,1

0.1

df+1

0.07

df+4

0.13

db+3

0.03

db+4

0.05

b,b

0.46

db

0.09

df

0.02

SSR,df+1

0.01

SWR

0.04

FC.2

0.01

FC.d+3

0.01

FC.df+4

0.04

ws1

0.06

ws2

0.01

ws4

0.02

df

0.13

SSR,b

0.68

SSR,1,1

0.01

SWR

0.04

Payoff for dominated options

1

-0.32

1,1

-5.47

4

-22.93

f+2

-54.26

df+2

-42.06

d+2

-8.22

d+3

-0.02

d+4

-2.26

d+3+4

-1.8

db+1

-8.65

b+2

-1.74

f,F+4

-44.64

uf+3,4

-37.16

uf+4

-39.36

SSR,b

0.17

SSR,1,1

-1.52

SSR,uf+4

-55.73

SSL,b

0.12

SSL,1,1

-2.38

SSL,df+1

-0.48

SSL,uf+4

-52.07

SWL

0.07

1+2

-16.13

FC.1

-0.53

ws1,2

-7.58

ws3

-12.05

ws4,4

-18.59

u+2

-23.34

f,F+2

-4.95

uf+3,4

-12.12

uf+4

-13.77

cc 4

-21.22

cc df+2

-24.12

cc b+1+2

-37.54

b,b

-0.95

db

-1.79

SSR,df+1

-0.57

SSR,uf+4

-27.54