User:Kalki/sandbox2: Difference between revisions

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Testing out the differences between the new and original mixup layout styles.
{{MixupTest|game.nfg}}
{{MixupTest|game.nfg}}


{{Mixup|game.nfg}}
{{Mixup|game.nfg}}
{{MixupTest|game2.nfg}}
{{Mixup|game2.nfg}}


{{MixupTest|Kazumi-fly-infinite.gbt}}
{{MixupTest|Kazumi-fly-infinite.gbt}}
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{{Mixup|Kazumi-db3-ak-13.gbt}}
{{Mixup|Kazumi-db3-ak-13.gbt}}
{{MixupTest|Kazumi-db3-ak-20.gbt}}
{{Mixup|Kazumi-db3-ak-20.gbt}}

Latest revision as of 17:19, 18 November 2023

Testing out the differences between the new and original mixup layout styles.

some comment

Rock
Paper
Scissors
Rock
0
-50
50
Paper
50
0
-50
Scissors
-50
50
0

Nash equilibrium with payoff 0

Rock
0.33
Paper
0.33
Scissors
0.33
Rock
0.33
Paper
0.33
Scissors
0.33

some comment

Rock
Paper
Scissors
Rock
0
-50
50
Paper
50
0
-50
Scissors
-50
50
0

Nash equilibrium with payoff 0

Rock
0.33
Paper
0.33
Scissors
0.33
Rock
0.33
Paper
0.33
Scissors
0.33

some other comment

Rock
Paper
Scissors
Lizard
Spock
Rock
0-111-1
Paper
10-1-11
Scissors
-1101-1
Lizard
-11-101
Spock
1-11-10

Nash equilibrium with payoff 0

Rock
0.2
Paper
0.2
Scissors
0.2
Lizard
0.2
Spock
0.2
Rock
0.2
Paper
0.2
Scissors
0.2
Lizard
0.2
Spock
0.2

some other comment

Rock
Paper
Scissors
Lizard
Spock
Rock
0-111-1
Paper
10-1-11
Scissors
-1101-1
Lizard
-11-101
Spock
1-11-10

Nash equilibrium with payoff 0

Rock
0.2
Paper
0.2
Scissors
0.2
Lizard
0.2
Spock
0.2
Rock
0.2
Paper
0.2
Scissors
0.2
Lizard
0.2
Spock
0.2

Kazumi FLY mixup in mirror after 1+2, ws3, and u/f+2 transitions on infinite stage.

d
b
SWR
4
FLY.1
29-31-6834
FLY.2
-75-317579
FLY.4,2
-80363639
FLY.1+2
242-68-68
FLY.3+4
64-681365

Nash equilibrium with payoff -4.79

FLY.4,2
0.39
FLY.1+2
0.33
FLY.3+4
0.28
d
0.35
b
0.44
SWR
0.21

Payoff for dominated options

FLY.1
-17.58
FLY.2
-24.48
4
-11.17

Kazumi FLY mixup in mirror after 1+2, ws3, and u/f+2 transitions on infinite stage.

d
b
SWR
4
FLY.1
29-31-6834
FLY.2
-75-317579
FLY.4,2
-80363639
FLY.1+2
242-68-68
FLY.3+4
64-681365

Nash equilibrium with payoff -4.79

FLY.4,2
0.39
FLY.1+2
0.33
FLY.3+4
0.28
d
0.35
b
0.44
SWR
0.21

Payoff for dominated options

FLY.1
-17.58
FLY.2
-24.48
4
-11.17

Payoff of f,f~f+4 vs ssr~2,1 is unclear since winner depends on timing, but it generally favours P1. There's also some chance that f,f,d/b+4 is delayed too much and loses.

b
d
ws2
ws4
ws1
FC.d+4
FC.d+1
ssr~2,1
f,f~f+4
-275-75-26-74-13-815
f,f,db+4
19-22-75-26-74-13-812
ssr,b
00352929-1158
df+1
01214-121414-8-75
d+3+4
6-22777726
df
00-18-22-7149490

Payoff of f,f~f+4 vs ssr~2,1 is unclear since winner depends on timing, but it generally favours P1. There's also some chance that f,f,d/b+4 is delayed too much and loses.

b
d
ws2
ws4
ws1
FC.d+4
FC.d+1
ssr~2,1
f,f~f+4
-275-75-26-74-13-815
f,f,db+4
19-22-75-26-74-13-812
ssr,b
00352929-1158
df+1
01214-121414-8-75
d+3+4
6-22777726
df
00-18-22-7149490
b
d
ws2
ws4
ws1
FC.d+4
FC.d+1
ssr~2,1
df,b
b,df
FC.df+2
d,b
b,d
ssr,b
ssr,df
f,f~f+4
-275-75-26-74-13-815-275-82-275-275
f,f,db+4
19-22-75-26-74-13-81219-55-8219-2219-55
ssr,b
00352929-11580010000
df+1
01214-121414-8-7512014120-3-3
d+3+4
6-22777726-5567-22666
df,b
00-18-22-71494980010000
df+4
-117-75-262020-81817-11717-1317
ssl
0062-2262-115800620000
f,F+4
-275-75-26-74-13-8-75573279-275-60-60
db+4
19-22-75-26-74-13-822222219-2219-55

Nash equilibrium with payoff 1.57

f,f~f+4
0.06
f,f,db+4
0.03
ssr,b
0.44
df+1
0.1
d+3+4
0.03
df,b
0.11
df+4
0.09
ssl
0.07
db+4
0.05
b
0.64
ws2
0.03
ws4
0.04
ws1
0.01
FC.d+4
0.07
ssr~2,1
0
df,b
0.08
FC.df+2
0.01
ssr,df
0.12

Payoff for dominated options

f,F+4
-8.1
d
-4.99
FC.d+1
-5.52
b,df
-3.3
d,b
-3.54
b,d
-3.02
ssr,b
-1.62
b
d
ws2
ws4
ws1
FC.d+4
FC.d+1
ssr~2,1
df,b
b,df
FC.df+2
d,b
b,d
ssr,b
ssr,df
f,f~f+4
-275-75-26-74-13-815-275-82-275-275
f,f,db+4
19-22-75-26-74-13-81219-55-8219-2219-55
ssr,b
00352929-11580010000
df+1
01214-121414-8-7512014120-3-3
d+3+4
6-22777726-5567-22666
df,b
00-18-22-71494980010000
df+4
-117-75-262020-81817-11717-1317
ssl
0062-2262-115800620000
f,F+4
-275-75-26-74-13-8-75573279-275-60-60
db+4
19-22-75-26-74-13-822222219-2219-55

Nash equilibrium with payoff 1.57

f,f~f+4
0.06
f,f,db+4
0.03
ssr,b
0.44
df+1
0.1
d+3+4
0.03
df,b
0.11
df+4
0.09
ssl
0.07
db+4
0.05
b
0.64
ws2
0.03
ws4
0.04
ws1
0.01
FC.d+4
0.07
ssr~2,1
0
df,b
0.08
FC.df+2
0.01
ssr,df
0.12

Payoff for dominated options

f,F+4
-8.1
d
-4.99
FC.d+1
-5.52
b,df
-3.3
d,b
-3.54
b,d
-3.02
ssr,b
-1.62