FC.1 | FC.4 | ws1 | ws2 | ws4 | swr,b4 | cc,d2 | cc,qcb2 | swr,b | cc,df | db | b,b | uf4 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FC.1 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | -43 | 9 | -75 | -4 | -50 | -3 | -4 | -45 |
FC.4 | -9 | 0 | -1 | 10 | -21 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 8 | -50 | -65 | 8 | -45 |
FC.df2 | -9 | 21 | 20 | 37 | -21 | 32 | 37 | -75 | 32 | 32 | 32 | -31 | 27 |
FC.df3 | -9 | -10 | -18 | -68 | -21 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 30 | -50 | -65 | 27 | -2 |
ws1 | -9 | -10 | -20 | 22 | -21 | 22 | 22 | -75 | 20 | 20 | 20 | -4 | 47 |
ws2 | -9 | -10 | -20 | 0 | -21 | 70 | 70 | 30 | -20 | 67 | 67 | -31 | 50 |
ws3 | -9 | -10 | -20 | 24 | -21 | 24 | 24 | -75 | 10 | 21 | 21 | -6 | 40 |
ws4 | -9 | 18 | 18 | 18 | -3 | -43 | 18 | -75 | -3 | 16 | 16 | -3 | 48 |
swl,3 | -10 | -8 | 55 | 70 | 60 | -10 | -25 | -80 | -1 | -5 | -5 | 0 | 70 |
swl,b3 | 34 | -8 | 19 | 34 | 24 | -20 | -25 | -80 | -2 | 18 | 18 | -2 | 34 |
ff,df | 40 | 55 | -18 | -65 | -18 | -30 | 40 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -45 |
ss,b | 3 | -8 | 2 | 30 | 2 | 5 | -17 | 63 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
db | 3 | 70 | -18 | -65 | -18 | -30 | 35 | 65 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -45 |
cc,db3,2 | -9 | -10 | -20 | -68 | -21 | 43 | 43 | -75 | 39 | -50 | -65 | -65 | -45 |
Nash equilibrium with payoff 1.24
- FC.df3
- 0.17
- ws2
- 0.08
- swl,3
- 0.01
- swl,b3
- 0.37
- ss,b
- 0.25
- db
- 0.12
- FC.4
- 0.06
- ws1
- 0.09
- swr,b4
- 0.07
- cc,qcb2
- 0.02
- db
- 0.22
- b,b
- 0.54
Payoff for dominated options
- FC.1
- -6.02
- FC.4
- -9.31
- FC.df2
- -5.81
- ws1
- 0.12
- ws3
- -0.59
- ws4
- 0.02
- ff,df
- -0.04
- cc,db3,2
- -50.17
- FC.1
- -11.44
- ws2
- -1.33
- ws4
- -2.57
- cc,d2
- -1.91
- swr,b
- -2.62
- cc,df
- -3.73
- uf4
- -18.81