some comment
Rock | Paper | Scissors | |
---|---|---|---|
Rock | 0 | -50 | 50 |
Paper | 50 | 0 | -50 |
Scissors | -50 | 50 | 0 |
Nash equilibrium with payoff 0
- Rock
- 0.33
- Paper
- 0.33
- Scissors
- 0.33
- Rock
- 0.33
- Paper
- 0.33
- Scissors
- 0.33
some comment
Rock | Paper | Scissors | |
---|---|---|---|
Rock | 0 | -50 | 50 |
Paper | 50 | 0 | -50 |
Scissors | -50 | 50 | 0 |
Nash equilibrium with payoff 0
- Rock
- 0.33
- Paper
- 0.33
- Scissors
- 0.33
- Rock
- 0.33
- Paper
- 0.33
- Scissors
- 0.33
Kazumi FLY mixup in mirror after 1+2, ws3, and u/f+2 transitions on infinite stage.
d | b | SWR | 4 | |
---|---|---|---|---|
FLY.1 | 29 | -31 | -68 | 34 |
FLY.2 | -75 | -31 | 75 | 79 |
FLY.4,2 | -80 | 36 | 36 | 39 |
FLY.1+2 | 24 | 2 | -68 | -68 |
FLY.3+4 | 64 | -68 | 13 | 65 |
Nash equilibrium with payoff -4.79
- FLY.4,2
- 0.39
- FLY.1+2
- 0.33
- FLY.3+4
- 0.28
- d
- 0.35
- b
- 0.44
- SWR
- 0.21
Payoff for dominated options
- FLY.1
- -17.58
- FLY.2
- -24.48
- 4
- -11.17
Kazumi FLY mixup in mirror after 1+2, ws3, and u/f+2 transitions on infinite stage.
d | b | SWR | 4 | |
---|---|---|---|---|
FLY.1 | 29 | -31 | -68 | 34 |
FLY.2 | -75 | -31 | 75 | 79 |
FLY.4,2 | -80 | 36 | 36 | 39 |
FLY.1+2 | 24 | 2 | -68 | -68 |
FLY.3+4 | 64 | -68 | 13 | 65 |
Nash equilibrium with payoff -4.79
- FLY.4,2
- 0.39
- FLY.1+2
- 0.33
- FLY.3+4
- 0.28
- d
- 0.35
- b
- 0.44
- SWR
- 0.21
Payoff for dominated options
- FLY.1
- -17.58
- FLY.2
- -24.48
- 4
- -11.17
Payoff of f,f~f+4 vs ssr~2,1 is unclear since winner depends on timing, but it generally favours P1. There's also some chance that f,f,d/b+4 is delayed too much and loses.
b | d | ws2 | ws4 | ws1 | FC.d+4 | FC.d+1 | ssr~2,1 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
f,f~f+4 | -2 | 75 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 15 |
f,f,db+4 | 19 | -22 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 12 |
ssr,b | 0 | 0 | 35 | 29 | 29 | -11 | 5 | 8 |
df+1 | 0 | 12 | 14 | -12 | 14 | 14 | -8 | -75 |
d+3+4 | 6 | -22 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 6 |
df | 0 | 0 | -18 | -22 | -71 | 49 | 49 | 0 |
Payoff of f,f~f+4 vs ssr~2,1 is unclear since winner depends on timing, but it generally favours P1. There's also some chance that f,f,d/b+4 is delayed too much and loses.
b | d | ws2 | ws4 | ws1 | FC.d+4 | FC.d+1 | ssr~2,1 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
f,f~f+4 | -2 | 75 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 15 |
f,f,db+4 | 19 | -22 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 12 |
ssr,b | 0 | 0 | 35 | 29 | 29 | -11 | 5 | 8 |
df+1 | 0 | 12 | 14 | -12 | 14 | 14 | -8 | -75 |
d+3+4 | 6 | -22 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 6 |
df | 0 | 0 | -18 | -22 | -71 | 49 | 49 | 0 |
b | d | ws2 | ws4 | ws1 | FC.d+4 | FC.d+1 | ssr~2,1 | df,b | b,df | FC.df+2 | d,b | b,d | ssr,b | ssr,df | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
f,f~f+4 | -2 | 75 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 15 | -2 | 75 | -82 | -2 | 75 | -2 | 75 |
f,f,db+4 | 19 | -22 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 12 | 19 | -55 | -82 | 19 | -22 | 19 | -55 |
ssr,b | 0 | 0 | 35 | 29 | 29 | -11 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
df+1 | 0 | 12 | 14 | -12 | 14 | 14 | -8 | -75 | 12 | 0 | 14 | 12 | 0 | -3 | -3 |
d+3+4 | 6 | -22 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 6 | -55 | 6 | 7 | -22 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
df,b | 0 | 0 | -18 | -22 | -71 | 49 | 49 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
df+4 | -1 | 17 | -75 | -26 | 20 | 20 | -8 | 18 | 17 | -1 | 17 | 17 | -1 | 3 | 17 |
ssl | 0 | 0 | 62 | -22 | 62 | -11 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 62 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
f,F+4 | -2 | 75 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | -75 | 57 | 32 | 79 | -2 | 75 | -60 | -60 |
db+4 | 19 | -22 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 22 | 2 | 2 | 22 | 19 | -22 | 19 | -55 |
Nash equilibrium with payoff 1.57
- f,f~f+4
- 0.06
- f,f,db+4
- 0.03
- ssr,b
- 0.44
- df+1
- 0.1
- d+3+4
- 0.03
- df,b
- 0.11
- df+4
- 0.09
- ssl
- 0.07
- db+4
- 0.05
- b
- 0.64
- ws2
- 0.03
- ws4
- 0.04
- ws1
- 0.01
- FC.d+4
- 0.07
- ssr~2,1
- 0
- df,b
- 0.08
- FC.df+2
- 0.01
- ssr,df
- 0.12
Payoff for dominated options
- f,F+4
- -8.1
- d
- -4.99
- FC.d+1
- -5.52
- b,df
- -3.3
- d,b
- -3.54
- b,d
- -3.02
- ssr,b
- -1.62
b | d | ws2 | ws4 | ws1 | FC.d+4 | FC.d+1 | ssr~2,1 | df,b | b,df | FC.df+2 | d,b | b,d | ssr,b | ssr,df | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
f,f~f+4 | -2 | 75 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 15 | -2 | 75 | -82 | -2 | 75 | -2 | 75 |
f,f,db+4 | 19 | -22 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 12 | 19 | -55 | -82 | 19 | -22 | 19 | -55 |
ssr,b | 0 | 0 | 35 | 29 | 29 | -11 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
df+1 | 0 | 12 | 14 | -12 | 14 | 14 | -8 | -75 | 12 | 0 | 14 | 12 | 0 | -3 | -3 |
d+3+4 | 6 | -22 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 6 | -55 | 6 | 7 | -22 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
df,b | 0 | 0 | -18 | -22 | -71 | 49 | 49 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
df+4 | -1 | 17 | -75 | -26 | 20 | 20 | -8 | 18 | 17 | -1 | 17 | 17 | -1 | 3 | 17 |
ssl | 0 | 0 | 62 | -22 | 62 | -11 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 62 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
f,F+4 | -2 | 75 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | -75 | 57 | 32 | 79 | -2 | 75 | -60 | -60 |
db+4 | 19 | -22 | -75 | -26 | -74 | -13 | -8 | 22 | 2 | 2 | 22 | 19 | -22 | 19 | -55 |
Nash equilibrium with payoff 1.57
- f,f~f+4
- 0.06
- f,f,db+4
- 0.03
- ssr,b
- 0.44
- df+1
- 0.1
- d+3+4
- 0.03
- df,b
- 0.11
- df+4
- 0.09
- ssl
- 0.07
- db+4
- 0.05
- b
- 0.64
- ws2
- 0.03
- ws4
- 0.04
- ws1
- 0.01
- FC.d+4
- 0.07
- ssr~2,1
- 0
- df,b
- 0.08
- FC.df+2
- 0.01
- ssr,df
- 0.12
Payoff for dominated options
- f,F+4
- -8.1
- d
- -4.99
- FC.d+1
- -5.52
- b,df
- -3.3
- d,b
- -3.54
- b,d
- -3.02
- ssr,b
- -1.62